Auftragstaktik o la superioridad militar táctica pruso-germana

Una sola palabra envuelve mucho más sentido y alcances que un objetivo de misión determinado, encierra todo un pensamiento y filosofía de mando, identificada la necesidad por Federico II de Prusia "El Grande" no fué sino hasta el genio militar de Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke que se formuló como un concepto que más tarde con el ascenso de Moltke pudo ser llevado y probado hasta que en 1888 apareció de forma oficial en el manual de campo del ejército prusiano. No percibido por ingleses y americanos y más difícil aún ser comprendido por cuestiones idiomáticas, "un democrático sistema de mando"  donde quienes están al frente son quienes pueden definir y determinar los alcances y las tácticas, no es raro por esto que a diferencia de otros muchos generales de los viejos ejércitos alemanes morían en el campo de batalla pues dese ahí dominaban la acción y podían definir, redondear, extender,  modificar en sí el alcance de la misión.

Auftragstaktik es sin duda una palabra más de esas al estilo alemán como Schadenfreude o Weltschmerz pero de características más delicadas, que depende como cais siempre en lo alemán de mejor preparación, criterio y también realización, no está libre de fallas pero ofrece ventajas evidentes. Las órdenes giradas por Oberst Kurt Zeitzler para invadir Francia solo fueron, atraviesen completamente las fronteras alemanas, atraviesen completamente la frontera Belga y atraviesen completamente el rio Mosa, así de sencillo... a su vez Heinz Guderian Lieutenant-General bajo su mando simplemente dijo a su XIX Panzerkorps "boleto de tren a la última estación" con ello diciendo que había que llegar hasta los poblados de la costa gala. ¿Sencillo verdad? Y la invasión procedió como ya sabemos.

Aquí dejo un ejemplo en inglés para tratar de entender en qué consiste:

In a hypothetical case an American company commander would get the order to attack and secure a certain village. He would be told to use first platoon to flank the village and third platoon to attempt a frontal assault. Four tanks would be attached to his company to support the frontal assault which would be the main effort. After several hours the company succeeded and the commander radioed back for further orders, the company commander all the while observing the actions from behind.

A German company commander would get the order to secure the village by 1600 hours period. Before the attack he would ensure that even a private knew what was expected of him during the attack. If his platoon commander and sergeant would fall, the enlisted man had to take over. The German company commander might put the allocated tanks on the heights adjacent to the village to provide covering fire or might drive them around the settlement to block the escape of the village defenders. He might take the village by frontal assault, infiltration or pincer attack -- whatever he saw fit the situation best and he would lead the attack that he had devised. After he secured the village he would pursue the remnants of the defenders and push forward with those of his elements who would not be immediately needed because he knew the overall idea of his superior was to attack and within the idea of Auftragstaktik all his actions were covered by the simple order to take the village at 1600 hours. Because of his training a German officer simply did not require detailed instruction.

This guy is coming at the U.S. military from such a different perspective that I am going to ask those who comment to read the twice piece before hitting send on their responses. 

And you thought I was tough on U.S. military education!

By Jörg Muth
Best Defense department of Auftragstaktikaffairs

Auftragstaktik. The word sounds cool even when mangled by an American tongue. What it means, however, has always been elusive to Americans. The problematic translation of that core German military word into "mission type orders" completely distorts its meaning. Auftragstaktik does not denote a certain style of giving orders or a certain way of phrasing them; it is a whole command philosophy.

The idea originates with Frederick the Great, who complained after more than one battle that his highly experienced regimental commanders would not dare take action on their own but too often ask back for orders and thus waste precious time.

Nearly one hundred years later the military genius Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was the first to formulate the concept of Auftragstaktik. Moltke was a diligent student of Frederick's campaigns, of military history in general and philosophy. At a time when he was not yet famous and, not yet the victor of three wars, he observed the annual General Staff war games in 1858. The paperwork and the detailed orders appalled him because he knew that in war there was no time for such nonsense. During the war game critique he decreed that "as a rule an order should contain only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own." Everything else was to be left to the commander on the spot.

In the following decades, when he rose to the highest rank of the Prussian and then the German Army, Moltke and his disciples promoted the concept in the military. However, the British military writer Basil H. Liddell Hart noted correctly, "that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is to get an old one out." Thus Auftragstaktik, not yet known under a single name, was heavily embattled and discussed in German military journals who were then leading in the world. In 1888, the year Moltke retired, it finally manifested itself officially in the field manual of the Prussian Army.

Interestingly, the literally hundreds of American observers who were regularly send to the old continent during the course of the 19th century to study the constantly warring European armies completely missed out on the decade long discussion about the revolutionary command philosophy of Auftragstaktik. Instead they focused on saddle straps, belt buckles and drill manuals. This is one reason why the most democratic command concept never found a home in the greatest democracy. The U.S. officers simply missed the origins because of their own narrow-minded military education.

Auftragstaktik, a command concept in which even the most junior officers were required to make far reaching decisions, demanded a significant change in officer education. In the German Kadettenschulen (cadet schools) hazing was squelched in a short time. The educational reforms for the officer's training in the Prussian/German army, because of the new command philosophy, have so far been overlooked in historiography. An officer had to be taught self-confidence, independent thinking and responsibility and not to be denigrated. In addition the seniority system was not set in stone as at West Point. At a Kadettenschuleyounger cadets could with excellent performance overtake older ones. This, together with the exemplary behavior of the teaching officers, was one of the greatest safe guards against hazing. At West Point no real will ever existed to eradicate it, even though nothing is more harmful to the leadership education of a future officer.

Because the U.S. Army did not possess the command culture of the Germans and Auftragstaktikthe differences of two operations should exemplify this. The instructions for the American Forces to land in North Africa had the size of a Sears Roebuck shopping catalogue.

But when the Germans attacked France Oberst (Colonel) Kurt Zeitzler, then Chief of Staff of Panzergruppe Kleist told to the assembled subordinated commanders of the fast troops and their staff officers: "Gentlemen, I demand that your divisions completely cross the German borders, completely cross the Belgian borders and completely cross the River Meuse. I don't care how you do it, that's completely up to you."

Generalleutnant(Lieutenant-General) Heinz Guderian, commander of XIX Panzerkorps, which was subordinated to Panzergruppe Kleist, gave an even more famous order to his units in the spirit of Auftragstaktik when he told them they all had a "ticket to the last station," which were the respective towns on the French coast. How his troops got there was entirely up to them. As a result the German fast troops made unrivaled progress.

Even after studying the Prussian and German armies for decades, American officers showed a "difficulty interpreting" the concept of Auftragstaktik and most would not come closer to it when they attended the next higher military education institute.

Only a very few American commanders -- George C. Marshall, George S. Patton, Matthew B. Ridgway and Terry de la Mesa Allen -- understood the concept, even though it has never been taught to them in American military schools. In these schools doctrine reigned and not free independent thinking. Doctrine, however, is either based on past wars or on theory and thus can be no guideline for an officer in a present-day conflict.

In World War II the result was a sluggish and almost timid operational and tactical command of most U.S. units with the exception of Patton's Third Army. The dean of U.S. military history, Russell Weigley, noted correctly that when an American commander showed ferociousness or wanted to put "unrelenting pressure" on the enemy he usually had to do so "despite every discouragement from his superiors."

The Germans didn't know such hampering on the tactical level and U.S. intelligence officers noted that 22-year old German lieutenants would command battalions with great success when their superiors had fallen in battle. It is one of the core concepts of Auftragstaktik that the commanding officer is on the frontlines and fights and dies with his men. German generals wounded in battle many times, sporting a close quarter combat badge or a tank destroyer badge, were no rarity in World War II. More than 220 German Generals died in combat in World War II, in contrast to only 10 percent of that number on the American side -- and of these, less than a handful died fighting.

Auftragstaktikis such a core part of the German command culture that until recently no German has ever written a book about it. An American has never done it because it was never understood.

If you have read thus far and still don't know what Auftragstaktik means, here is an example:

In a hypothetical case an American company commander would get the order to attack and secure a certain village. He would be told to use first platoon to flank the village and third platoon to attempt a frontal assault. Four tanks would be attached to his company to support the frontal assault which would be the main effort. After several hours the company succeeded and the commander radioed back for further orders, the company commander all the while observing the actions from behind.

A German company commander would get the order to secure the village by 1600 hours period. Before the attack he would ensure that even a private knew what was expected of him during the attack. If his platoon commander and sergeant would fall, the enlisted man had to take over. The German company commander might put the allocated tanks on the heights adjacent to the village to provide covering fire or might drive them around the settlement to block the escape of the village defenders. He might take the village by frontal assault, infiltration or pincer attack -- whatever he saw fit the situation best and he would lead the attack that he had devised. After he secured the village he would pursue the remnants of the defenders and push forward with those of his elements who would not be immediately needed because he knew the overall idea of his superior was to attack and within the idea of Auftragstaktik all his actions were covered by the simple order to take the village at 1600 hours. Because of his training a German officer simply did not require detailed instruction.

So why the heck did the Germans lose the war if they had such a revolutionary command culture? As the name denotes, Auftragstaktik is a tactical and at most an operational concept, it has no advantage on the strategic level.

The other main reason for the defeat of the Wehrmacht is the sheer boundless arrogance of its officer corps. Being for so long the most famous and prominent group in a nation and admired by their countrymen and international observers alike left its pathological marks. The result became "a persistent tendency of most German Generals to underestimate the size and the quality of the opposing forces."

In the time of greatest crisis the German officer corps became its worst enemy. Traditionally, the most battle experienced officers would gain the highest ranks in the Prussian/German armies, but that had changed with the new officer selection system introduced after the Versailles Treaty. No staff officer who had never even held regimental command, and in the worst case only commanded a desk, would reach the highest ranks. That led to ridiculous situations.

During one of the many desperate situations of the Wehrmacht in August 1942 the Chief of Staff of the Army Generaloberst Franz Halder asked Adolf Hitler to allow units of Army Group North to pull back. The dictator replied that he deemed it not feasible and that "we must hold out in the best interest of the troops." Halder remarked angrily in return that "out there brave rifleman and lieutenants are falling in the thousands as senseless victims" because of Hitler's inflexibility. That, however, caused the dictator to boil over and he screamed at his chief of staff: "What do you want, Herr Halder, you who only, and in the First World War too, sat on the same revolving stool, telling me about the troops, you, who have never once worn the black wound badge?!"

And it was Halder, and not the Dictator Hitler, who basically nullified Auftragstaktikon the Eastern Front because he was no longer able to deal with the independence of the commanders of the fast troops. Hitler just took over the same system after he fired Halder.

All those immense flaws of the Wehrmacht senior officers counterbalanced the excellence in command, tactics and leadership German officers displayed in World War II. The latter explains why the German army was such an outstanding fighting force on the tactical level but still unable to win the war.

Though the mediocre professional military education of the U.S. Army has taken leaps and bounds since those dark times, never has it been attempted to introduce the most effective command philosophy ever invented into the U.S. Army.

An American brigade commander with more than two decades of experience still has to ask his division commander for permission to operate, who in turn asks the corps commander, who in turn asks the theatre commander. The latter two are usually - as it is unfortunate custom in the U.S. Army -- far removed from the battlefield. And decisions are made in an air-conditioned command bunker in Doha about a combat situation in Fallujah -- sometimes the results are merely comical, but sometimes they are fatal.

If the most important verb and the most important noun should be found for the U.S. Army and the Wehrmacht according to the vast amount of manuals, regulations, letters, diaries and autobiographies I have read they would be 'to manage' and 'doctrine' for the U.S. Army and führen (to lead) and Angriff (attack) for the Wehrmacht. Such a comparison alone points out a fundamentally different approach to warfare and leadership.

Because especially in the War on Terror there have been more and more swift actions by small units, a rigid inflexible command system has been hampering the progress of US forces all over the globe. It is time the U.S. Army assesses again its command culture.

Jörg Muth is the author of Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II. (University of North Texas Press, 2011.)

La Wehrmacht (fuerzas armadas alemanas) ofrecieron un plan de paz, rendición y de desnazificación a los aliados en 1943

Esta historia sacada a relucir por un investigador de religión judía muestra como la Wehrmacht y personajes como el generas Runstedt o Helmut James Von Möltke ( familia de larga tradición militar prusiana) buscaron y ofrecieron a los aliados occidentales un plan de rendición y paz, así como anti nazi, eliminando nazis y a SS y Waffen SS, para enfocarse en la guerra contra la URSS.

Es obvio que por alguna razón o intereses este plan no prosperó.

From Reform Judaism Magazine:

http://reformjudaismmag.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=1484

The German Overture

The untold story of how in 1943 — a year before the Walkyrie plot to assassinate Hitler — the German High Command offered to turn Wehrmacht forces against the Waffen-SS Nazi troops and help America win the war. An RJ exclusive interview with Charles Fenyvesi.

A former staff writer for The Washington Post, U.S. News & World Report, Ha’aretz, and The Jerusalem Post, as well as editor of The National Jewish Monthly, Charles Fenyvesi now files a weekly electronic newsletter, Bigotry Monitor, on human rights and is also the author, most recently, of When the Angels Fooled the World, on rescuers of Jews in wartime Budapest (University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).


The attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944 is well known and the subject of the recent movie Valkyrie. How is it that you discovered evidence of an earlier plot to turn German forces against the Nazis that has escaped detection, even by historians?

I was lucky. In 2002 I was combing through box after box of newly declassified wartime documents at the U.S. National Archives, looking for information on assets expropriated by the Nazis, when I came across a series of communications that astonished me. In early July 1943, Count Helmuth James von Moltke, an emissary of the German High Command—the equivalent of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff—made a secret visit to the Office of Special Services (the OSS was the forerunner to the CIA) in Istanbul, Turkey, offering to turn Wehrmacht forces against the Waffen-SS Nazi troops loyal to Hitler and make a separate peace with the Americans. [“Dogwood Project, Istanbul Mission,” submitted by Arch F. Coleman, second in command of the OSS Istanbul station, December 5, 1944]


Moltke, the German military intelligence service (Abwehr) representative at the German High Command and a lifelong anti-Nazi, told the OSS he would reveal the purpose of his mission only to one person: Alexander Kirk, the U.S. ambassador in Cairo. Kirk had been a friend of Moltke’s from the time the American diplomat served as the chargé d’affaires in Berlin in the 1930s. Moltke trusted him.


How did the OSS operatives in Istanbul respond to Moltke’s request?

They were interested, as their mission statement called for encouraging anti-Nazi resistance. But they couldn’t arrange a meeting with Kirk.


Why not?

According to John Waller, then an OSS officer in Cairo, Kirk was afraid of getting involved on behalf of a German officer, likely because he himself, an independently wealthy man, employed a German man as his personal secretary/physician who everyone at the legation knew was his lover. Wartime regulations strictly forbade embassies from employing an enemy alien, even if a U.S. official paid his salary. Waller suggests that Kirk probably reckoned that taking up Moltke’s cause would have turned attention to his illegal hire. The diplomat and historian George F. Kennan offers a different explanation in his Memoirs 1925-1950: Kirk, a cautious opportunist, was unwilling to get involved in “causes,” reluctant to write reports, and “afraid of being held responsible.”


What, then, did Moltke decide to do?

He confided in another old friend, Dr. Hans Wilbrandt, an anti-Nazi German émigré professor of philosophy at the University of Istanbul who had been recruited by the OSS. Wilbrandt, highly regarded by OSS-Istanbul, reacted enthusiastically to the generals’ initiative, vouched for Moltke’s anti-Nazi bona fides, and reported to his OSS bosses the details of Moltke’s message: the anti-Nazi Wehrmacht generals he represented proposed to “withdraw key troops from the French coast” to allow for the Anglo-American “invasion to enter France with the least possible trouble.” Wehrmacht resistance would be only “token.” Further, the withdrawal of “SS and pro-Nazi troops would permit the Anglo-Americans to march in from the west and occupy Germany.” At the same time, the “Wehrmacht would muster its strongest forces against the Russians….” [“Dogwood Project, Istanbul Mission” report]

Moltke also presented to the OSS a list of the highest ranking Germans involved in the conspiracy. Among them were some of the Wehrmacht’s most capable commanders: Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Germany’s titular “First Soldier” regarded as the war’s most brilliant strategist; Field Marshal Wilhelm List, who had been removed from a prestigious command position by Hitler because of his refusal to sanction harsh retaliations against guerrillas on the Russian front; Colonel General Ludwig Beck, Hitler’s first chief of the general staff; Colonel General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff from 1938 to 1942; and “possibly” Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, who was opposed to Nazism but was known as chronically indecisive. Also included on the list was a civilian: former Leipzig mayor Carl Gördeler. [“Dogwood Project, Istanbul Mission” report] Naming the conspirators was a dramatic gesture, probably designed to underscore the seriousness of the offer.


Whose idea was this plot?

According to the same OSS document [“Dogwood Project, Istanbul Mission” report], signed by Arch F. Coleman, the plot appears to be headed by Rundstedt. On the list of the German conspirators the first name is Rundstedt, indicating that Rundstedt was the leader. (The list is not alphabetical, and it does not follow rank.) Most importantly, in the hierarchical structure of the German military, which OSS respected, the first person mentioned in a group was the leader.


Rundstedt’s leadership also makes sense from a military perspective. The oldest and most respected member of the High Command, he was the one general that other officers and the troops were most likely to obey in the event that he issued an order to confront the Waffen-SS.


What was Moltke’s next move?

He left for Berlin, promised to return, and in the meantime maintained contact with Wilbrandt. In mid-December 1943 he flew back to Istanbul, again in the hope of meeting with and encouraging Ambassador Kirk to back the High Command offer. But Kirk still did not want to get involved, so Moltke met instead with the U.S. military attaché in Ankara, Major General Richard Tindall. A standard-issue U.S. army officer, Tindall was put off by the German aristocrat’s highfalutin intellectual stance and Moltke’s reluctance to hand over intelligence information to him. Instead, Moltke penned a letter—which he asked Tindall to forward to Kirk—calling for joint military action by the Western Allies and the Wehr­macht units commanded by anti-Nazi generals to make use of “effective military power on a very considerable scale” that “will undoubtedly prove overwhelming once our assistance is added.” [National Archives and Records Administration Record Group 226, Entry 190, Microfilm 1462, Roll 52]


Did OSS-Istanbul notify Washington of these developments?

Yes. Relying on Professor Wilbrandt’s assessment, the second in command at OSS-Istanbul, Arch F. Coleman, vouched for Moltke’s anti-Nazi bona fides, and between August and December 1943 sent a series of memoranda promoting the conspirators’ plan to OSS headquarters in Washington. Alfred Schwarz, co-director of the OSS North European Operation, and Lanning Macfarland, OSS-Istanbul station chief, did the same, pointing out that the anti-Nazi group went as far as favoring “an understanding with the Allies even on the basis of unconditional surrender,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s most stringent demand to end the war. [NARA RG 226, Entry 211, Box 20]


How did OSS-Washington respond?

John Waller told me that Coleman sent memoranda to OSS-Washington director William Donovan in July 1943, but Donovan was reluctant to pass them on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to President Roosevelt, even though Donovan had direct access to both.


Why?

According to Waller, Donovan’s subordinates persuaded him that FDR would object to any contacts with German officials for fear of angering America’s Soviet ally. Any hint of such an arrangement was bound to enrage Stalin and play into his fears of an Anglo-American scheme to enlist Germany in an anti-Bolshevik crusade. [The Unseen War in Europe by John Waller, Random House, 1996, and personal interviews] Moreover, Donovan himself was well aware of FDR’s hatred of Germans, whom he saw as congenitally aggressive and imperialistic. Widely quoted among the OSS and U.S. diplomats at the time was a remark Roosevelt was said to have uttered: “An anti-Nazi German is only a shade better than a Nazi German.”


What, then, did Donovan do?

He referred the question of the credibility of Moltke’s offer to two German affairs experts, one within and one outside the OSS. The outside consultant, Professor Karl Brandt of Stanford University, welcomed the German High Command offer, warning the OSS that more than half a million American boys would die battling Germany on the French coast “before the fortress will fall by military assault only” and praising Moltke and his co-conspirators as “the most respectable revolutionary group inside Germany, lodged in vital strategic positions” capable of assuring Anglo-American occupation and keeping the Russians out of Central Europe in a “practicable and politically permissible [way].” Dismissing the possibility of a “slick ruse” by the High Command, Brandt gave “full credence” to the “sincerity” of the conspirators’ efforts, and proposed that the U.S. military establish a formal liaison group with the conspirators. [NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Microfilm 1462, Roll 52, February 28, 1944]


The second consultant, William Langer, head of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch and a history professor at Harvard in civilian life, took the opposite position. He disputed the existence of a “fairly large, well-organized, and influential” opposition group in Germany that was “in a position to have its orders carried out.” In Langer’s opinion, “nothing can be done in Germany until the Nazi regime collapses, and no such collapse is probable in the immediate future unless the armies are defeated decisively.” Langer did allow that certain elements “must be thinking of surrender to the Anglo-Americans to avoid being overrun by Bolshevik armies,” but he characterized as “hackneyed” the German idea of enlisting Anglo-American help against the Bolsheviks. He further warned that considering the German generals’ plan without Russian “knowledge and agreement” would be a “grave mistake” and contended that the Russians were “prepared to play ball but equally prepared and determined to execute a volte-face if the British and the Americans do not play fair.” His recommendation, issued on March 15, 1944, was to “keep the wires open” and find out more about Moltke’s group in the High Command, but “lay all military plans as though this group [does] not exist.” [NARA RG 226, Entry 110, Box 47]


Whose opinion did headquarters embrace?

Langer’s. On April 3, 1944, almost nine months after Moltke first contacted the OSS in Istanbul, the OSS Planning Group in Washington formally rejected the offer and decided not to transmit it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a technicality: it required no military action. OSS-Istanbul was instructed to explore the possibilities raised by the proposition and to make use of any of Moltke’s connections who might be helpful to the invasion of the continent “without any regard whatsoever for any further consideration such as the future of Europe or the future of Germany.” Then came two stern final warnings: “But consider the possibility that the group is a possible instrument of double agents and have no regard whatsoever for the German individuals involved.” [NARA RG 226, Entry 110, Box 47]


Nine months was a long period of indecision.

Yes. And by that time all the men on Moltke’s list were involved in or at least had some advance knowledge of the July 20, 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler in the operation code-named Walkyrie. Moltke himself was already in prison for having organized a circle of anti-Nazi clergy, intellectuals, labor leaders, and government officials, and for drafting a blueprint for a democratic, post-Nazi German state. The Gestapo arrested him on January 19, 1944. He, along with dozens of others, were tried and found guilty of plotting against the Nazi state. He was executed on January 23, 1945.


What was the fate of the others on “Moltke’s List”?

Colonel General Beck, among the first of the Walkyrie conspirators to be arrested, shot himself in the head but survived and was reduced to pleading with a sergeant to finish the job. He died on July 20, 1944.


Field Marshal Kluge, commander-in-chief of the German forces in France, tried on August 15 to contact U.S. Army General George Patton to sue for an armistice but could not get a phone connection. [Hitler’s Generals, edited by Correlli Barnett, Grove Weidenfeld Publishers, 1989] Hitler caught the whiff of treason and fired him, prompting Kluge to swallow a cyanide capsule on August 19, 1944.


Field Marshal List, fired by Hitler in 1942 because of his reluctance to comply with orders to get tough with partisans on the Russian front and suspected by the Gestapo of involvement in Walkyrie, disappeared, thus avoiding a Nazi trial. He was later tried by the Nuremberg International Tribunal and sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes. In 1952 he was released on the grounds of declining health and lived in peace and comfort for another nineteen years.


Colonel General Franz Halder was arrested by the Gestapo the day after the Walkyrie plot in which he was implicated, but somehow evaded the death sentence and spent the rest of the war in the VIP prison within the Dachau concentration camp run by the SS. Afterwards, Halder served for the rest of his life as director of the German section of the historical division of the United States military government in occupied Germany. He contributed greatly to America’s understanding of Germany at the time, topping the list of William Shirer’s sources for The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Simon & Schuster, 1959). In 1961 he received the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the highest American civilian medal for services to the United States.


The former Leipzig mayor, Carl Gördeler, was brought before the “people’s court” set up by the SS, found guilty of treason, and executed on February 2, 1945.


Field Marshal Rundstedt knew of Walkyrie, but did not take part because, as he told his colleagues, it was not right to assassinate the head of state to whom he had sworn “unconditional obedience.” [interview with CIA officer James Critchfield, who knew Rundstedt, and the consensus of historians] Still, ever faithful to his pledge of obedience to the Führer, Rundstedt later accepted Hitler’s invitation to preside over a makeshift “court of honor” that transferred officers accused of complicity in Walkyrie from the jurisdiction of a traditional Wehrmacht court to a merciless SS kangaroo court.


So Hitler never suspected Rundstedt of treason.

That’s right. In fact, in early September 1944, as the Allies closed in on Germany, the Führer asked Rundstedt, by then no longer in active service, to command a counteroffensive designed to push back the invading Anglo-American armies to the sea. According to documents cited by the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, the general replied: “My Führer, whatever you order, I shall do to my last breath.”


Did he live up to this promise?

He did. Ironically, the last German counteroffensive in the war, the Battle of the Bulge, was initially successful largely because Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt’s troops looked up to him and trusted his battlefield expertise. Familiar with the Ardennes woods, the site of his earlier victorious campaign in 1940, he commanded up to twenty-eight divisions—some half a million men—including several of the toughest Waffen-SS units as well as large numbers of teenagers and grandfathers ordered into uniforms a few weeks earlier. Up to the last moments of his army’s disintegration in the midst of a total collapse of German forces, Rundstedt applied smart military tactics and added the inventive touches for which he was admired. In the end, his troops were defeated—about 120,000 killed, wounded, or captured—but not before inflicting a heavy death toll on Allied forces, an estimated 16,000–19,000.


Was Rundstedt’s role in the 1943 plot ever revealed?

No. It was not brought up at the Nuremberg tribunal, where the prosecution charged Rundstedt with war crimes in Poland, the Soviet Union, and on the Western front. He was detained until 1949, but not tried because of ill health. Following his death in 1953, a handful of Wehrmacht officers in civilian clothes and top hats followed the horse-drawn hearse to the grave.


So the top men on “Moltke’s List” took action on or knew of the plot to kill Hitler.

Yes. This gives great credence to Moltke and the others’ intentions to support U.S. military operations to end the war.


What united these conspirators?

I agree with the historian Joachim Fest, who wrote in Plotting Hitler’s Death (Henry Holt and Company, 1996) that they were united by their dislike of Hitler and the belief that the war he had begun recklessly and micromanaged disastrously would end in Germany’s destruction.


What happened to the OSS operatives in Istanbul who had championed the plotters’ cause?

Arch Coleman and Lanning Macfarland were sent home by headquarters, a punishment for hiring double agents and allowing Nazi penetration of the station—charges advanced by OSS officer Frank Wisner, who was sent to Istanbul to investigate. On July 31, 1944, Wisner fired Alfred Schwarz, a Czech Jew, accusing him of being a German agent—an absurd charge that was never investigated or proved.


What happened to Alexander Kirk?

John Waller told me that Kirk, along with his German partner, stayed in place until the end of the war. In 1946 Kirk was reassigned to Rome as ambassador, his last assignment before retirement.


What happened to the OSS’s chief in Washington, William Donovan?

After President Truman abruptly shut down the OSS in 1945, Donovan was named assistant to Robert Jackson, the chief American prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials.


The world might have looked quite different had the anti-Nazi generals taken out Hitler in 1943.

Very different. With German forces split between Hitler diehards and anti-Nazis, the Western Allies could have won the war by early 1944 or mid-1944 at the latest. [interview with CIA sources] It is safe to say that more than 700,000 Jewish lives could have been saved. Of Hungary’s 725,000 Jews—the last intact Jewish community in Hitler-controlled Europe—600,000 were sent to Ausch­witzfrom May to December 1944, and at least 460,000 of them were killed. Most of the French and Dutch Jewish victims—100,000 each—perished in 1944, along with more than half of the 50,000 Jews in Greece. The extermination of nearly all the remaining Jews in Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and Italy was also completed in 1944. Tens of thousands were tracked down and shot, or gassed in Ausch­witz—which was not liberated until January 1945. Among them was Anne Frank, deported along with 1,018 others on the last Dutch transport to Auschwitz on September 2, 1944. She died in Bergen-Belsen in March 1945.


Tens of thousands of Roma and Polish gentiles were also killed in 1944.


On the battlefield, hundreds of thousands of lives could have been saved. U.S. casualties (killed and wounded) in the Battle of the Bulge alone are estimated at between 81,000 and 104,000. And in the Normandy invasion, 36,976 American soldiers lost their lives.


How is it possible that the 1943 conspiracy almost ended up in the dustbin of history?

The OSS documents referring to it were originally stamped “TOP SECRET.” Declassification could have come sooner, but according to my CIA sources, people concerned with protecting FDR’s reputation probably objected. In the early postwar years Americans were in no mood to debate such a potentially controversial and embarrassing issue as the victorious president’s refusal to deal with anti-Nazi German generals. It was only after the U.S. Congress adopted the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act in 1998 that declassification began, and the pages themselves were not fully released until 2002, when I began my search. Going through more than eight million pages—remember, there’s no computerization of records here—is extremely time consuming, which explains why so few researchers have made the effort.


It is clear to me that revealing this truth will please very few, with the possible exception of those wishing to ease the burden of German guilt. The 1943 plot is one of history’s inconvenient facts.


Copyright © 2009 Union for Reform Judaism.

Respaldando lo dicho: el odio anglosajón a Prusia

Ya comentamos antes como Inglaterra y Estados Unidos y otros aliados veían en Prusia al enemigo formidable capaz de mandar sus imperios e imperialismos anglosajones-judíos al caño, bueno aquí traigo un poco de detalles extra sobre el asunto.

Y no, Prusia (Brandenburgo-Prusia) no es la cuna del nazismo quien diga eso es un asno propagandista, el nazismo surge en Munich, Bavaria pero como sus militantes exmilitares y veteranso de guerras pasados fueron formados en la enseñanza prusiana los actuales asnos asumen entonces que el mal era Prusia, pero si analizan encontraran que Prusia por ejemplo tenia la tolerancia religiosa como uno de sus valores. Así que no vengan a cuentear, a Prusia se le borró por el miedo que se le tenía en que borrara otros imperios como el decrépito y anacrónico imperio inglés.

El diablo de Prusia
Texto: Enrique Müller
04/03/2002
http://servicios.laverdad.es/panorama/reportaje040302-3.htm

Cuando aún no se vislumbraba el final de la última guerra mundial y los soldados aliados combatían en todos los frentes con la Wehrmacht de Hitler, Winston Churchill tenía una obsesión que le perseguía día y noche. El estadista británico no perdía ocasión para advertir a sus interlocutores de que Prusia era la encarnación del «diablo alemán». Franklin D. Roosevelt, en cambio, acariciaba un objetivo diferente: borrar Prusia del mapa en cuanto los nazis fueran derrotados.

El certificado oficial de defunción fue dado a conocer por el Consejo de Control de los aliados el 25 de febrero de 1947, cuando acordaron disolver un Estado que, «desde siempre, ha sido la cuna del militarismo y de la reacción en Alemania». Konrad Adenauer, el visionario político democristiano y primer canciller de la postguerra, tenía una idea más radical que los propios aliados. En 1946, cuando nadie sabía lo que el futuro deparaba al país destruido, Adenauer sentenció que los políticos que cometieran el pecado de restaurar el estatus de Berlín como capital de Alemania también estarían devolviendo a la ciudad el espíritu prusiano.

El temor casi premonitorio de Adenauer y el odio visceral hacia Prusia de Churchill y Roosevelt hundían sus raíces tan profundamente como la huella dejada por el imperio prusiano en la historia de Europa. ¿Acaso no fue Prusia la cuna de Friedrich II, llamado Federico el Grande, el monarca que formó un ejército de casi 200.000 hombres bien entrenados y armados, con el cual logró transformar su desolado reino en uno de los imperios más poderosos del viejo continente? ¿Acaso no fue en Potsdam donde Hitler celebró, en el marco de la espléndida Garnisonkirche, el «enlace entre los símbolos de la antigua grandeza y la nueva fuerza?». Ese día, el 21 de marzo de 1933, el espíritu de Potsdam degeneró en el decorado de un régimen de terror.

La memoria
En 1990, Alemania recuperó la capitalidad de Berlín, consiguió eliminar la odiosa frontera interna que dividió al país durante la Guerra Fría, y, ahora, mira hacia un futuro nuevo y apasionante con la ampliación de la Unión Europea hacia el Este. Pero los muertos en política tienen aquí larga vida y, hace una semana, un destacado socialdemócrata provocó un terremoto al proponer que Prusia debe renacer de las cenizas de la historia. El medio, la fusión de los estados de Brandeburgo y Berlín, como es el deseo de la mayoría de la población.

«Los dos estados forman la base de la vieja Prusia», señaló Alwin Ziel, ministro de Asuntos Sociales del Gobierno regional de Brandeburgo, al mencionar uno de los tabúes más delicados de la memoria colectiva germana. La propuesta, como era de esperar, provocó una larga y apasionada discusión entre los defensores y los enemigos de resucitar un nombre asociado con la expansión militarista, pero también con los valores germanos más tradicionales, como la disciplina y la obediencia.

«¿Necesitamos realmente una nueva Prusia?», se preguntó el diario Bild en su primera página, al recordar que fue el régimen nazi el que había abusado de los viejos valores prusianos de lealtad y obediencia. «El nombre de Prusia puede despertar falsas asociaciones en Alemania y en cualquier otra parte», advirtió Julian Nida-Rumelin, ministro federal de Cultura, alertado por el debate que vive la nación.

La propuesta de Ziel de revivir el Estado prusiano en sus nuevas fronteras ha vuelto a dejar al desnudo una de las cicatrices más sensibles del país; una cicatriz que aún no se ha logrado cerrar, aunque haya transcurrido más de medio siglo del fin de la guerra. El pasado reciente de la nación, los horrores del nazismo y la pérdida de territorio en la república checa y en Pomerania pertenecen a la historia, pero siguen estando grabadas en la memoria colectiva de Alemania.

«Prusia es una palabra hermosa. Es maravilloso que Prusia no sea la totalidad, pero claramente parte de la totalidad. La realización de esa idea reforzaría el federalismo», dijo Martin Walser, uno de los escritores más famosos del país, al aplaudir la idea de rebautizar el futuro Estado como Prusia. «Es una propuesta fantástica», sentenció el príncipe Ferfried von Hohenzollern. «No es para nada absurda», añadió el duque Carl Eduard von Bismarck.
El debate, sin embargo, no es nuevo. La actitud ambivalente de los alemanes hacia el pasado prusiano salió a flote en 2001, cuando Berlín celebró con actos solemnes el 300 aniversario de la coronación de Friedrich I, que marcó el nacimiento del viejo Estado.

Gestos del pasado
El primer año del nuevo milenio fue bautizado en Alemania como el Año de Prusia. Docenas de libros sobre este episodio de la historia ocuparon las vitrinas de las librerías; el canciller Gerhard Schröder dejó saber que estaba a favor de reconstruir el palacio imperial en Berlín; la estatua de Federico el Grande regresó a la avenida Unter den Linden, después de ser minuciosamente restaurada; y un documental convirtió casi en héroe a Wilhelm II, el último emperador prusiano.

56 años después del fin de la última guerra mundial, Prusia, otrora la encarnación del mal, comenzó a recuperar su lugar en la historia. Hasta el punto de que el Bild ofreció a sus lectores una lista de las virtudes prusianas que tanto echa de menos la sociedad germana actual: lealtad, autodisciplina, frugalidad, obedencia y aplicación.

Pero el Bild olvidó –¿o fue a propósito?– publicar el catálogo de los vicios prusianos, como el militarismo, el autoritarismo, el expansionismo, la obediencia ciega y, el peor de todos, constituirse en el progenitor del nazismo. Aun así, más del 70% de la población de Berlín y Brandeburgo se declara a favor de una fusión de los dos territorios para dar vida nuevamente al Estado prusiano.

Muchos expertos en la historia de Alemania insisten en que la relación que hubo entre Prusia y el nazismo es mucho más estrecha de lo que el pueblo desea aceptar. Pero también hay quienes insisten en que la historia de Prusia aún puede ser un ejemplo para la Alemania moderna. El viejo imperio defendió la libertad religiosa, fomentó la inmigración y dio protección a los judíos.

En la cúspide de su poder, Prusia se extendía desde la frontera con Francia hasta Rusia, cubría gran parte del territorio de la actual Polonia e, incluso, Lituania y contaba con una población de cuarenta millones de habitantes. La victoria de Prusia sobre Francia, orquestada desde Berlín por Otto von Bismark, el Canciller de Hierro, abrió el camino para la unificación de Alemania en 1871. Pero el militarismo agresivo de la elite aristocrática que rodeaba al Kaiser Wilhelm II fue determinante para que Europa se hundiera en la I Guerra Mundial.

La hiperinflación que invadió al país y las reparaciones que tuvo que pagar Alemania a sus vencedores facilitaron la llegada al poder de Hitler, a quien la propaganda nazi retrató como el sucesor natural de Bismarck y Federico el Grande. Aunque muchos militares prusianos ayudaron a Hitler a obtener sus primeras victorias, también fueron aristócratas prusianos quienes intentaron asesinar al dictador en 1944.

Todos los males
«Prusia ha sido acusada de ser responsable de todos los males que ha vivido Europa en el siglo XX», dijo Klaus Dieter Lehmann, presidente de la Fundación de la Herencia Cultural Prusiana. «Es cierto que en Prusia había un estricto poder militar jerárquico, pero también el Estado prusiano promovió la educación, las ciencias y la cultura». Pero, ¿quién recuerda que fue en Prusia donde Alexander von Humboldt ideó la estructura básica de lo que es ahora la universidad alemana?

«Si el año de Prusia tiene éxito en fomentar el orgullo en nuestro propio país, habremos tenido éxito en su intención», dijo Manfred Stolpe, jefe del Gobierno regional de Brandeburgo. «Los pueblos que están orgullosos de su propia historia son más resistentes a la xenofobia». Pero Brandeburgo, el Estado que rodea a Berlín y en donde se encuentra Potsdam, la ciudad preferida de los monarcas prusianos, es el más afectado por la violencia de los neonazis, los fanáticos nietos de Hitler, que han vuelto a sembrar el miedo y el terror en Alemania.

Breve analisis sobre historia alemana y el surgimiento de Prusia, el estallido de la 1a y 2a guerra y el papel de las demás potencias mundiales.

Siempre se califica a Alemania como belicosa por "naturaleza" pero se olvida que quien tilda asi a este país son las muy poco imprialistas y colonialistas Inglaterra, Francia, Rusia y Estados Unidos, vencedores por cierto de las dos contiendas mundiales y de ahi, escritores de la verdad oficial. No no me lloriqueen, aqui no se trata sobre abusos y crueldad contra grupos poblacionales si no de simple y pura geopolitica. Este es un interesante articulo del centro Stratfor, a leer sin falta, para entender el por qué y como de un mundo germano aguijoneado internamente y emanazado por mar, y en tierra al oriente por Rusia/URSS y al occidente por Francia e Inglaterra. Si la verdad no es como la pintan siempre, al menso puede entenderse de otro modo, maá objetivo y cierto.

Todo estoa propósito de la reciente invasión rusa a Georgia y como Alemania ha tenido que lidiar con ello.

Why Germany is lukewarm about Nato
Once again, Germany faces a menacing Russia to its east.
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/why_germany_is_lukewarm_about_nato/

This article was first published on the Stratfor website. The author, George Friedman, is chairman and CEO of Stratfor, the world’s leading online publisher of geopolitical intelligence.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel went to St. Petersburg last week for meetings with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. The central question on the table was Germany’s position on NATO expansion, particularly with regard to Ukraine and Georgia. Merkel made it clear at a joint press conference that Germany would oppose NATO membership for both of these countries, and that it would even oppose placing the countries on the path to membership. Since NATO operates on the basis of consensus, any member nation can effectively block any candidate from NATO membership.

The fact that Merkel and Germany have chosen this path is of great significance. Merkel acted in full knowledge of the U.S. view on the matter and is prepared to resist any American pressure that might follow. It should be remembered that Merkel might be the most pro-American politician in Germany, and perhaps its most pro-American chancellor in years. Moreover, as an East German, she has a deep unease about the Russians. Reality, however, overrode her personal inclinations. More than other countries, Germany does not want to alienate the United States. But it is in a position to face American pressure should any come.

Energy Dependence and Defense Spending

In one sense, Merkel’s reasons for her stance are simple. Germany is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. If the supply were cut off, Germany’s situation would be desperate — or at least close enough that the distinction would be academic. Russia might decide it could not afford to cut off natural gas exports, but Merkel is dealing with a fundamental German interest, and risking that for Ukrainian or Georgian membership in NATO is not something she is prepared to do.

She can’t bank on Russian caution in a matter such as this, particularly when the Russians seem to be in an incautious mood. Germany is, of course, looking to alternative sources of energy for the future, and in five years its dependence on Russia might not be nearly as significant. But five years is a long time to hold your breath, and Germany can’t do it.

The German move is not just about natural gas, however. Germany views the U.S. obsession with NATO expansion as simply not in Germany’s interests.

First, expanding NATO guarantees to Ukraine and Georgia is meaningless. NATO and the United States don’t have the military means to protect Ukraine or Georgia, and incorporating them into the alliance would not increase European security. From a military standpoint, NATO membership for the two former Soviet republics is an empty gesture, while from a political standpoint, Berlin sees it as designed to irritate the Russians for no clear purpose.

Next, were NATO prepared to protect Ukraine and Georgia, all NATO countries including Germany would be forced to increase defense expenditures substantially. This is not something that Germany and the rest of NATO want to do.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Germany spent 1945-1992 being the potential prime battleground of the Cold War. It spent 1992-2008 not being the potential prime battleground. Germany prefers the latter, and it does not intend to be drawn into a new Cold War under any circumstances. This has profound implications for the future of both NATO and U.S.-German relations.

Germany is thus in the midst of a strategic crisis in which it must make some fundamental decisions. To understand the decisions Germany has to make, we need to understand the country’s geopolitical problem and the decisions it has made in the past.

The German Geopolitical Problem

Until 1871, Germany was fragmented into dozens of small states — kingdoms, duchies, principalities, etc. — comprising the remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. The German-speaking world was torn apart by internal tensions and the constant manipulation of foreign powers.

The southeastern part of the German-speaking world, Austria, was the center of the multinational Hapsburg Empire. It was Roman Catholic and was continually intruding into the predominantly Catholic regions of the rest of Germany, particularly Bavaria. The French were constantly poaching in the Rhineland and manipulating the balance of power among the German states. Russia was always looming to the east, where it bordered the major Protestant German power, Prussia. (Poland at the time was divided among Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary.) Germany was perpetually the victim of great powers, a condition which Prussia spent the roughly half-century between Waterloo and German unification trying to correct.

To unify Germany, Prussia had to do more than dominate the Germans. It had to fight two wars. The first was in 1866 with the Hapsburg Empire, which Prussia defeated in seven weeks, ending Hapsburg influence in Germany and ultimately reducing Austria-Hungary to Germany’s junior partner. The second war was in 1870-1871, when Prussia led a German coalition that defeated France. That defeat ended French influence in the Rhineland and gave Prussia the space in which to create a modern, unified Germany. Russia, which was pleased to see both Austria-Hungary and France defeated and viewed a united Germany as a buffer against another French invasion, did not try to block unification.

German unification changed the dynamic of Europe. First, it created a large nation in the heart of Europe between France and Russia. United, Germany was economically dynamic, and its growth outstripped that of France and the United Kingdom. Moreover, it became a naval power, developing a substantial force that at some point could challenge British naval hegemony. It became a major exporting power, taking markets from Britain and France. And in looking around for room to maneuver, Germany began looking east toward Russia. In short, Germany was more than a nation — it was a geopolitical problem.

Germany’s strategic problem was that if the French and Russians attacked Germany simultaneously, with Britain blockading its ports, Germany would lose and revert to its pre-1871 chaos. Given French, Russian and British interest in shattering Germany, Germany had to assume that such an attack would come. Therefore, since the Germans could not fight on two fronts simultaneously, they needed to fight a war pre-emptively, attacking France or Russia first, defeating it and then turning their full strength on the other — all before Britain’s naval blockade could begin to hurt. Germany’s only defense was a two-stage offense that was as complex as a ballet, and would be catastrophic if it failed.

In World War I, executing the Schlieffen Plan, the Germans attacked France first while trying to simply block the Russians. The plan was to first occupy the channel coast and Paris before the United Kingdom could get into the game and before Russia could fully mobilize, and then to knock out Russia. The plan failed in 1914 at the First Battle of the Marnes, and rather than lightning victory, Germany got bogged down in a multifront war costing millions of lives and lasting years. Even so, Germany almost won the war of attrition, causing the United States to intervene and deprive Berlin of victory.

In World War II, the Germans had learned their lesson, so instead of trying to pin down Russia, they entered into a treaty with the Soviets. This secured Germany’s rear by dividing Poland with the Soviet Union. The Soviets agreed to the treaty, expecting Adolf Hitler’s forces to attack France and bog down as Germany had in World War I. The Soviets would then roll West after the bloodletting had drained the rest of Europe. The Germans stunned the Russians by defeating France in six weeks and then turning on the Russians. The Russian front turned into an endless bloodletting, and once again the Americans helped deliver the final blow.

The consequence of the war was the division of Germany into three parts — an independent Austria, a Western-occupied West Germany and a Soviet-occupied East Germany. West Germany again faced the Russian problem. Its eastern part was occupied, and West Germany could not possibly defend itself on its own. It found itself integrated into an American-dominated alliance system, NATO, which was designed to block the Soviets. West and East Germany would serve as the primary battleground of any Soviet attack, with Soviet armor facing U.S. armor, airpower and tactical nuclear weapons. For the Germans, the Cold War was probably more dangerous than either of the previous wars. Whatever the war’s outcome, Germany stood a pretty good chance of being annihilated if it took place.

On the upside, the Cold War did settle Franco-German tensions, which were half of Germany’s strategic problem. Indeed, one of the by-products of the Cold War was the emergence of the European Community, which ultimately became the European Union. This saw German economic union and integration with France, which along with NATO’s military integration guaranteed economic growth and the end of any military threat to Germany from the west. For the first time in centuries, the Rhine was not at risk. Germany’s south was secure, and once the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no threat from the east, either.

United and Secure at Last?

For the first time in centuries, Germany was both united and militarily secure. But underneath it all, the Germans retained their primordial fear of being caught between France and Russia. Berlin understood that this was far from a mature reality; it was no more than a theoretical problem at the moment. But the Germans also understand how quickly things can change. On one level, the problem was nothing more than the economic emphasis of the European Union compared to the geopolitical focus of Russia. But on a deeper level, Germany was, as always, caught between the potentially competing demands of Russia and the West. Even if the problem were small now, there were no guarantees that it wouldn’t grow.

This was the context in which Germany viewed the Russo-Georgian war in August. Berlin saw not only the United States moving toward a hostile relationship with Russia, but also the United Kingdom and France going down the same path.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who happened to hold the rotating EU presidency at the time, went to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire on behalf of the European Union. When the Russians seemed unwilling to comply with the terms negotiated, France became highly critical of Russia and inclined to back some sort of sanctions at the EU summit on Georgia. With the United Kingdom being even more adamant, Germany saw a worst-case scenario looming on the distant horizon: It understood that the pleasant security of the post-Cold War world was at an end, and that it had to craft a new national strategy.

From Germany’s point of view, the re-emergence of Russian influence in the former Soviet Union might be something that could have been blocked in the 1990s, but by 2008, it had become inevitable. The Germans saw that economic relations in the former Soviet Union — and not only energy issues — created a complementary relationship between Russia and its former empire. Between natural affinities and Russian power, a Russian sphere of influence, if not a formal structure, was inevitable. It was an emerging reality that could not be reversed.

France has Poland and Germany between itself and Russia. Britain has that plus the English Channel, and the United States has all that plus the Atlantic Ocean. The farther away from Russia one is, the more comfortable one can be challenging Moscow. But Germany has only Poland as a buffer. For any nation serious about resisting Russian power, the first question is how to assure the security of the Baltic countries, a long-vulnerable salient running north from Poland. The answer would be to station NATO forces in the Baltics and in Poland, and Berlin understood that Germany would be both the logistical base for these forces as well as the likely source of troops. But Germany’s appetite for sending troops to Poland and the Baltics has been satiated. This was not a course Germany wanted to take.

Pondering German History

We suspect that Merkel knew something else; namely, that all the comfortable assumptions about what was possible and impossible — that the Russians wouldn’t dare attack the Baltics — are dubious in the extreme. Nothing in German history would convince any reasonable German that military action to achieve national ends is unthinkable. Nor are the Germans prepared to dismiss the re-emergence of Russian military power. The Germans had been economically and militarily shattered in 1932. By 1938, they were the major power in Europe. As long as their officer corps and technological knowledge base were intact, regeneration could move swiftly.

The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and its military power crumbled. But as was the case in Weimar Germany, the Russian officer corps remained relatively intact and the KGB, the heart of the Soviet state, remained intact if renamed. So did the technological base that made the Soviets a global power. As with Germany after both world wars, Russia was in chaos, but its fragments remained, awaiting reconstruction. The Germans were not about to dismiss Russia’s ability to regenerate — they know their own history too well to do that.

If Germany were to join those who call for NATO expansion, the first step toward a confrontation with Russia would have been taken. The second step would be guaranteeing the security of the Baltics and Poland. America would make the speeches, and Germans would man the line. After spending most of the last century fighting or preparing to fight the Russians, the Germans looked around at the condition of their allies and opted out.

The Germans see their economic commitment as being to the European Union. That binds them to the French, and this is not a bond they can or want to break. But the European Union carries no political or military force in relation to the Russians. Beyond economics, it is a debating society. NATO, as an institution built to resist the Russians, is in an advanced state of decay. To resurrect it, the Germans would have to pay a steep economic price. And if they paid that price, they would be carrying much of the strategic risk.

So while Germany remains committed to its economic relationship with the West, it does not intend to enter into a military commitment against the Russians at this time. If the Americans want to send troops to protect the Baltics and Poland, they are welcome to do so. Germany has no objection — nor do they object to a French or British presence there. Indeed, once such forces were committed, Germany might reconsider its position. But since military deployments in significant numbers are unlikely anytime soon, the Germans view grand U.S. statements about expanded NATO membership as mere bravado by a Washington that is prepared to risk little.

NATO After the German Shift

Therefore, Merkel went to St. Petersburg and told the Russians that Germany does not favor NATO expansion. More than that, the Germans at least implicitly told the Russians that they have a free hand in the former Soviet Union as far as Germany is concerned — an assertion that cost Berlin nothing, since the Russians do enjoy a free hand there. But even more critically, Merkel signaled to the Russians and the West that Germany does not intend to be trapped between Western ambitions and Russian power this time. It does not want to recreate the situation of the two world wars or the Cold War, so Berlin will stay close to France economically and also will accommodate the Russians.

The Germans will thus block NATO’s ambitions, something that represents a dramatic shift in the Western alliance. This shift in fact has been unfolding for quite a while, but it took the Russo-Georgian war to reveal the change.

NATO has no real military power to project to the east, and none can be created without a major German effort, which is not forthcoming. The German shift leaves the Baltic countries exposed and extremely worried, as they should be. It also leaves the Poles in their traditional position of counting on countries far away to guarantee their national security. In 1939, Warsaw counted on the British and French; today, Warsaw depends on the United States. As in 1939, these guarantees are tenuous, but they are all the Poles have.

The United States has the option of placing a nuclear umbrella over the Baltics and Eastern Europe, which would guarantee a nuclear strike on Russia in the event of an attack in either place. While this was the guarantee made to Western Europe in the Cold War, it is unlikely that the United States is prepared for global thermonuclear war over Estonia’s fate. Such a U.S. guarantee to the Baltics and Eastern Europe simply would not represent a credible threat.

The other U.S. option is a major insertion of American forces either by sea through Danish waters or via French and German ports and railways, assuming France or Germany would permit their facilities to be used for such a deployment. But this option is academic at the moment. The United States could not deploy more than symbolic forces even if it wanted to. For the moment, NATO is therefore an entity that issues proclamations, not a functioning military alliance, in spite of (or perhaps because of) deployments in Afghanistan.

Everything in German history has led to this moment. The country is united and wants to be secure. It will not play the role it was forced into during the Cold War, nor will it play geopolitical poker as it did in the first and second world wars. And that means NATO is permanently and profoundly broken. The German question now turns into the Russian question: If Germany is out of the game, what is to be done about Russia?